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Abstract—Within the future Global Information Grid, complex massively interconnected systems, isolated defense vehicles, sensors 
and effectors, and infrastructures and systems demanding extremely low failure rates, to which human security operators cannot have 
an easy access and cannot deliver fast enough reactions to cyber-attacks, need an active, autonomous and intelligent cyber defense. 
Multi Agent Systems for Cyber Defense may provide an answer to this requirement. This paper presents the concept and architecture 
of an Autonomous Intelligent Cyber defense Agent (AICA). First, we describe the rationale of the AICA concept. Secondly, we explain 
the methodology and purpose that drive the definition of the AICA Reference Architecture (AICARA) by NATO’s IST-152 Research 
and Technology Group. Thirdly, we review some of the main features and challenges of Multi Autonomous Intelligent Cyber defense 
Agent (MAICA). Fourthly, we depict the initially assumed AICA Reference Architecture. Then we present one of our preliminary 
research issues, assumptions and ideas. Finally, we present the future lines of research that will help develop and test the AICA / 
MAICA concept. 
Keywords—intelligent agent, autonomy, cyber warfare, cyber security 
I. RATIONALE FOR THE AICA/MAICA CONCEPT 
Today, five broad types of systems coexist in Land, Sea and Air operations: 
• Office and information management systems, which includes web services, emailing systems, and information 
management applications ranging from human resource management to logistics through maintenance and project 
management; 
• C4ISR systems for the command of war operations, with associated Battlefield Management Systems that extend the 
C4ISR down to single vehicles and platoons; 
• Communication systems such as SATCOM, L16, line of sight networks, software defined radios, etc.; 
• Platform and life automation systems, similar to industrial systems and that provide sea vessels for instance with air 
conditioning, refrigeration, lifts, video surveillance, etc.; 
• Weapon systems, which include both sensors and effectors of all kinds, including the Internet of Battle Things (IoBT). 
On the battlefield, the future Global Information Grid will mix those technologies into complex large scale networks of 
massively interconnected systems, the cybersecurity supervision of which by human operators will become increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible. 
Besides, a great number of military missions will require defense vehicles and effectors to work stealthily while some will find 
themselves isolated because of poor bandwidth or because communications will become untrustworthy. Isolated systems will create 
a specific class of problems in terms of the possibility to monitor and manage their cybersecurity. On one hand, to fully analyze 
their cyber-health would be possible only when connected at base during maintenance and operation preparation. On the other 
hand, in case of cyber-attacks, they will require immediate counter-reactions while no cybersecurity or cyber defense specialist is 
available. 
Finally, defense infrastructures and systems engaged in battle operations must show extremely low failure rates. Counter 
reactions to cyber-attacks must therefore be initiated at the speed of operation of these systems, not at the (low) speed of human 
decision making in the presence of complex issues. In a conflict with a technically sophisticated adversary, military tactical 
networks will be a heavily contested battlefield. Enemy software cyber agents -- malware -- will infiltrate friendly networks and 
attack friendly C4ISR and computerized weapon systems. 
In this context, systems’ cyber defense will be organized in two manners: 
• Connected systems of lesser criticality will be monitored by cybersecurity sensors, security information and event 
management (SIEM) systems, and security operations centers (SOCs). This will be the case of office and information 
management systems and of C4ISR systems under peaceful circumstances. 
• Higher grade systems or configurations such as C4ISR systems deployed in combat circumstances, communication 
systems, life and automation systems and weapon systems require autonomous intelligent cyber defense capabilities. 
To fight cyber-attacks that may target this last class of military systems, we expect that NATO needs artificial cyber hunters - 
intelligent, autonomous, mobile agents specialized in active cyber defense, that we call Autonomous Intelligent Cyber defense 
Agents (AICA). They will work in cohorts or swarms and will be capable, together, to detect cyber-attacks, devise the appropriate 
counter measures, and run and adapt tactically their execution. 
Those friendly NATO cyber agents -- goodware -- will stealthily patrol networks, detect enemy agents while remaining 
concealed, and they will devise the appropriate counter-attack plan and then destroy or degrade the enemy malware. They will do 
so mostly autonomously, because human cyber experts will be always scarce on the battlefield, because human reactions will be 
too slow, and because connectivity might be nonexistent or poor.  
Agents will be learning and adaptive because the enemy malware and attack patterns are constantly evolving. They will be 
stealthy because the enemy malware will try to find and kill them. They will work in cohorts or swarms as attacks will be 
sophisticated and stealthy, and only collective intelligence will stand a chance to detect the early combined signs of malware 
This paper is based on NATO IST Panel activity IST-152-RTG, “Intelligent, Autonomous and Trusted Agents for Cyber Defense and Resilience.” 
actions and positions. In addition, they will do so because combatting malware will mean fighting a variety of pieces of malware 
acting either simultaneously or in a sequence hard to detect, and intelligently spread across the friendly military systems and 
networks they attack to produce the effect sought by the enemy. 
Deployed on NATO networks, the AICA friendly software agents will become a major force multiplier. The agents will 
augment the inevitably limited capabilities of human cyber defenders, and will team with humans when ordered or in need to do so. 
Without such agents, the effective defense of NATO computer networks and systems might become impossible if attackers also 
resort on multi agent systems to carry out their attacks. Without active autonomous intelligent cyber defense agents, a NATO 
C4ISR will not survive an encounter with a determined, technically sophisticated enemy.  
At this time, such capabilities remain unavailable for the defensive purposes of NATO. To acquire and successfully deploy such 
agents, in an inter-operable manner, NATO Nations must create a common technical vision - reference architecture - and a 
roadmap. 
II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE PROJECT 
Inspired by the above rationale, NATO’s IST-152 Research and Technology Group (RTG) is an activity that was initiated by 
the NATO Science and Technology Organization and was kicked-off in September 2016. The group is developing a 
comprehensive, use case focused technical analysis methodology in order to produce a first-ever reference architecture and 
technical roadmap for active autonomous intelligent cyber defense agents. In addition, the RTG is working to identify and evaluate 
selected elements that may be eligible contributors to such capabilities and that begin to appear in academic and industrial research. 
Scientists and engineers from several NATO Nations have brought unique expertise to this project. Only by combining multiple 
areas of distinct expertise along with a realistic and comprehensive approach can such a complex software agent be provided.  
The output of the RTG may become a tangible starting point for acquisition activities by NATO Nations. If based on a common 
reference architecture, software agents developed or purchased by different Nations will be far more likely to be interoperable. 
III. MAIN FEATURES AND CHALLENGES OF THE MAICA CONCEPT 
Related research includes Mayhem (from DARPA Cyber Challenge, but also Xandra, etc.), agents from the Pechoucek’s group, 
Professor Mancini’s work on the AHEAD architecture [1] and the Aerospace Cyber Resilience research chair’s research program 
[2], Anti-Virus tools (Kaspersky, Bitdefender, Avast, Norton, etc. etc.), HBSS, OSSEC, Various host-based IDS/IPS systems, 
Application Performance Monitoring Agents, Anti-DDOS systems and Hypervisors. Also, a number of related research directions 
include topics such as deep learning (especially if it can be computationally inexpensive), Botnet technology (seen as a network of 
agents), network defense games, flip-it games, the Blockchain, and fragmentation and replication. The introduction of Artificial 
Intelligence into military systems, such as C4ISR, has been studied, for instance by [3] and [4]. Multi Agent Systems form an 
important part of AI. 
Since the emergence of the concept of Multi Agent Systems (e.g., [5]), MAS have been deployed in a number of contexts such 
as power engineering [6] and their decentralized automated surveillance [7], industrial systems [8], networked and intelligent 
embedded systems [9], collective robotics [10], wireless communication [11], traffic simulation and logistics planning [12], home 
automation [13]. 
However, if the use of intelligent agents for the cyber defense of network-centric environments has already long been envisaged 
[14], effective research in this area is still new. 
In the context of the cyber defense of friendly systems, an “agent” has been defined [2] as a piece of software or hardware, an 
autonomous processing unit: 
• With an individual mission and the corresponding competencies, i.e. in analyzing the milieu in which the agent is 
inserted, detecting attacks, planning the required countermeasures, or steering and adapting tactically the execution of 
the latter, or providing support to other agents like for instance inter-agent communication; 
• With proactivity, i.e. the capacity to engage into actions and campaigns without the need to be triggered by another 
program or by a human operator; 
• With autonomy, i.e. a decision making capacity of its own, the capacity to function or to monitor, control and repair 
itself on its own, without the need to be controlled by another program or by a human operator, and the capacity to 
evaluate the quality of its own work and to adjust its algorithms in case of deviance from its norm or when its rewards 
(satisfaction of its goals) get poor; 
• Driven by goals, decision making and other rules, knowledge and functions fit for its purpose and operating 
circumstances; 
• Learning from experience to increase the accuracy of its decisions and the power of its reactions; 
• With memories (input, process, output, storage); 
• With perception, sensing and action, and actuating interfaces; 
• Built around the adequate architecture and appropriate technologies; 
• Positioned around or within a friendly system to defend, or patrolling across a network; 
• Sociable, i.e. with the capacity to establish contact and to collaborate with other agents, or to enter into a cyber 
cognitive cooperation when the agent requires human help or to cooperate with a central Cyber C2;  
• Trustworthy, i.e. that will not deceive other agents nor human operators; 
• Reliable; i.e. that do what they are meant to do, during the time specified and under the conditions and circumstances of 
their concept of operation; 
• Resilient, i.e. both robust to threats (including cyber-threats aimed at disabling or destroying the agent itself; the agent 
being able to repel or withstand everyday adverse events and to avoid degrading), and resistant to incidents and attacks 
that may hit and affect the agent when its robustness is insufficient (i.e. the agent is capable of recovering from such 
incidents or attacks); 
• Safe, i.e., conceived to avoid harming the friendly systems the agent defends, for instance by calling upon a human 
supervisor or central cyber C2 to avoid making wrong decisions or to adjust their operating mode to challenging 
circumstances, or by relocating when the agent is the target of an attack and if relocation is feasible and allows 
protecting it, or by activating a fail-safe mode, or by way of self-destruction when no other possibility is available. 
In the same context (ibid), a multi agent system is a set of agents: 
• Distributed across the parts of the friendly system to defend; 
• Organized in a swarm (horizontal coordination) or cohort (vertical coordination); 
• In which agents may have homogeneous or heterogeneous roles and features; 
• Interoperable and interacting asynchronously in various ways such as indifference, cooperation, competition; 
• Pursuing a collective non-trivial cyber defense mission, i.e. allowing to piece together local elements of situation 
awareness or propositions of decision, or to split a counter-attack plan into local actions to be driven by individual 
agents; 
• Capable of self-organization, i.e. as required by changes in circumstances, whether external (the attack’s progress or 
changes in the friendly system’s health or configuration) or internal (changes in the agents’ health or status); 
• That may display emergent behaviors [15], i.e. performances that are not explicitly expressed in individual agents’ goals, 
missions and rules; in the context of cyber defense, “emergence” is likely to be an interesting feature as, consisting in the 
“way to obtain dynamic results, from cooperation, that cannot easily be predicted in a deterministic way” [15]; it can be 
disturbing to enemy software in future malware-goodware “tactical” combats within defense and other complex systems; 
• Extensible or not, i.e. open or closed to admitting new agents in the swarm or cohort; 
• Safe, trustworthy, reliable and resilient as a whole, which is a necessity in the context of cyber defense whereas in other, 
less challenging contexts may be unnecessary. Resilience, here, may require maintaining a system of virtual roles as 
described in a human context by [16]. 
AICA will not be simple agents. Their missions, competencies, functions and technology will be a challenging construction in 
many ways. 
Among many such challenges, we can mention [2] working in constrained environments, the design of agents’ architecture and 
the attribution of roles and possible specialization to each of them, agents’ decision making process [17], the capacity to generate 
and execute autonomously plans of counter-measures in case of an attack, agents’ autonomy, including versus trustworthiness, 
MAICA’s safety to defense systems, cyber cognitive cooperation [18], agents’ resilience in the face of attacks directed at them by 
enemy software, agents’ learning capacities and the development of their functional autonomy, the specification and emergence of 
collective rules for the detection and resolution of cyber-attacks, AICA agents’ deployment concepts and rationale, their integration 
into host hardware as [8] showed in industrial system contexts, etc. 
IV. THE INITIAL AICA REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE 
To start the research with an initial assumption about agents’ architecture, the IST-152-RTG designed the AICA Reference 
Architecture on the basis of classical perspective reflected in [19] and [20]. 
At the present moment, it is assumed to include the following functional components: 
 
Figure 1 Assumed functional architecture of the AICA 
 
The AICA Reference Architecture delivers five main high-level functions: 
• Sensing and world state identification. 
• Planning and action selection. 
• Collaboration and negotiation. 
• Action execution. 
• Learning and knowledge improvement. 
 
Figure 2 The AICA’s main five high-level functions 
 
A. Sensing and World state identification 
DEFINITION: Sensing and World state identification is the AICA’s high-level function that allows a cyber-defense agent to 
acquire data from the environment and systems in which it operates as well as from itself in order to reach an understanding of the 
current state of the world and, should it detect risks in it, to trigger the Planning and Action selection high-level function. This high-
level function relies upon the “World model”, “Current state and history”, “Sensors” and “World State Identifier” components of 
the assumed functional architecture.  
The Sensing and World state identification high-level function includes two functions: (1) Sensing; (2) Word state 
identification. 
a-1. Sensing 
DESCRIPTION: Sensing operates from two types of data sources: (1) External (system and device-related) current world state 
descriptors; (2) Internal (agent-related) current state descriptors. 
Current world state descriptors, both external and internal, are captured on the fly by the agent’s Sensing function. They may be 
double-checked, formatted or normalized for later use by the World state identification function (to create processed current state 
descriptors). 
a-2. World state identification 
DESCRIPTION: The World state identification function operates from two sources of data: (1) Processed current state 
descriptors; (2) Learnt world state patterns. 
Learnt world state patterns are stored in the agent’s world knowledge repository. Processed current state descriptors and Learnt 
world state patterns are compared to identify problematic current world state patterns (i.e. presenting an anomaly or a risk). When 
identifying a problematic current world state pattern, the World state identification function triggers the Planning and Action 
selection high-level function. 
b. Planning and action selection 
DEFINITION: Planning and action selection is the AICA’s high-level function that allows a cyber-defense agent to elaborate 
one to several action proposals and to propose them to the Action selector function that decides the action or set of actions to 
execute in order to resolve the problematic world state pattern previously identified by the World state identifier function. This 
high-level function relies upon the “World dynamics”, “Actions and effects”, “Goals”, “Actions’ effect predictor” and “Action 
selector” components of the assumed functional architecture.  
The Planning and action selector high-level function includes two functions: (1) Planning; (2) Action selector. 
b-1. Planning 
DESCRIPTION: The Planning function operates on the basis of two data sources: (1) Problematic current world state pattern; 
(2) Repertoire of actions (Response repertoire). 
The Problematic current world state pattern and Repertoire of actions (Response repertoire) are concurrently explored in order 
to determine the action or set of actions (Proposed response plan) that can resolve the submitted problematic current world state 
pattern. The action or set of actions so determined are presented to the Action selector. It may be possible that the Planning 
function requires some form of cooperation with human operators (cyber cognitive cooperation, C3).  
It may alternatively require cooperation with other agents or with a central cyber C2 (command and control) in order to come 
up with an optimal set of actions forming a global response strategy. Such cooperation could be either to request from other agents 
or from the cyber C2 complementary action proposals, or to delegate to the cyber C2 the responsibility of coordinating a global set 
of actions forming the wider response strategy. 
It may be possible that the Planning function requires some form of cooperation with human operators (cyber cognitive 
cooperation, C3). It may alternatively require cooperation with other agents or with a central cyber C2 (command and control) in 
order to come up with an optimal set of actions forming a global response strategy. Such cooperation could be either to request 
from other agents or from the cyber C2 complementary action proposals, or to delegate to the cyber C2 the responsibility of 
coordinating a global set of actions forming the wider response strategy.  
These aspects have been the object of an initial study in [17] where options such as offline machine learning, pattern 
recognition, online machine learning, escalation to a human operator, game theoretic option search, and failsafe have been 
envisaged, and in [18] for cyber cognitive cooperation processes.  
b-2. Action selector 
DESCRIPTION: The Action selector function operates on the basis of three data sources: (1) Proposed response plans; (2) 
Agent’s goals; (3) Execution constraints and requirements, e.g., the environment’s technical configuration, etc. 
The proposed response plan is analyzed by the Action selector function in the light of the agent’s current goals and of the 
execution constraints and requirements that may either be part of the world state descriptors gained through the Sensing and World 
state identifier high-level function or be stored in the agent’s data repository and originated in the Learning and Knowledge 
improvement high-level function. The proposed response plan is then trimmed from whatever element does not fit the situation at 
hand, and augmented of prerequisite, preparatory or precautionary or post-execution recommended complementary actions. The 
Action selector thus produces an Executable Response Plan, and then submitted to the Action execution high-level function. 
Like with the Planning function, it is possible that the Action selector function requires to liaise with human operators, other 
agents or a central cyber C2 (command and control) in order to come up with an optimal Executable Response Plan forming part of 
and being in line with a global response strategy. Such cooperation could be to exchange and consolidate information in order to 
come to a collective agreement on the assignment of the various parts of the global Executable Response Plan and the execution 
responsibilities to specific agents. It could alternatively be to delegate to the cyber C2 the responsibility of elaborating a 
consolidated Executable Response Plan and then to assign to specific agents the responsibility of executing part(s) of this overall 
plan within their dedicated perimeter. This aspect is not yet studied in the present release of the AICA Reference Architecture.  
c. Collaboration and negotiation 
DEFINITION: Collaboration and negotiation is the AICA’s high-level function that allows a cyber-defense agent 1) to 
exchange information (elaborated data) with other agents or with a central cyber C2, for instance when one of the agent’s functions 
is not capable on its own to reach satisfactory conclusions or usable results, and 2) to negotiate with its partners the elaboration of a 
consolidated conclusion or result. This high-level function relies upon the “Coordinate with other agents and C2” component of the 
assumed functional architecture.  
The Collaboration and negotiation high-level function includes, at the present stage, one function: Collaboration and 
negotiation. 
DESCRIPTION: The Collaboration and negotiation function operates on the basis of three data sources: (1) Internal, outgoing 
data sets (i.e. sent to other agents or to a central C2); (2) External, incoming data sets (i.e. received from other gents or from a 
central cyber C2); (3) Agents’ own knowledge (i.e. consolidated through the Learning and knowledge improvement high-level 
function). 
When an agent’s Planning and action selector function or other function needs it, the agent’s Collaboration and negotiation 
function is activated. Ad hoc data are sent to (selected) agents or to a central C2. The receiver(s) may be able, or not, to elaborate 
further on the basis of the data received through their own Collaboration and negotiation function. At this stage, when each agent 
(including possibly a central cyber C2) has elaborated further conclusions, it should share them with other (selected) agents, 
including (or possibly not) the one that placed the original request for collaboration. Once this (these multiple) response(s) 
received, the network of involved agents would start negotiating a consistent, satisfactory set of conclusions. Once an agreement 
reached, the concerned agent(s) could spark the next function within their own decision making process. 
When the agent’s own security is threatened the agent’s Collaboration and negotiation function should help warning other 
agents (or a central cyber C2) of this state.  
Besides, the agent’s Collaboration and negotiation function may be used to receive warnings from other agents that may trigger 
the agent’s higher state of alarm. 
Finally, the agent’s Collaboration and negotiation function should help agents discover other agents and establish links with 
them.  
d. Action execution 
DEFINITION: The Action execution is the AICA’s high-level function that allows a cyber-defense agent to effect the Action 
selector function’s decision about an Executable Response Plan (or the part of a global Executable Response Plan assigned to the 
agent), to monitor its execution and its effects, and to provide the agents with the means to adjust the execution of the plan (or 
possibly to dynamically adjust the plan) when and as needed. This high-level function relies upon the “Goals” and “Actuators” 
components of the assumed functional architecture.  
The Action execution high-level function includes four functions: 
• Action effector; 
• Execution monitoring; 
• Effects monitoring; 
• Execution adjustment. 
d-1. Action effector 
DESCRIPTION: The Action effector function operates on the basis of two data sources: 
• Executable Response Plan; 
• Environment’s Technical Configuration. 
Taking into account the Environment’s Technical Configuration, the Action effector function executes each planned action in 
the scheduled order. 
d-2. Execution monitoring 
DESCRIPTION: The Execution monitoring operates on the basis of two data sources: 
• Executable Response Plan; 
• Plan execution feedback. 
The Execution monitoring function should be able to monitor (possibly through the Sensing function) each action’s execution 
status (for instance: done, not done, and wrongly done). Any status apart from “done” should trigger the Execution adjustment 
function. 
d-3. Effects monitoring 
DESCRIPTION: The Effects monitoring function operates on the basis of two data sources: (1) Executable Response Plan; (2) 
Environment’s change feedback. 
It should be able to capture (possibly through the Sensing function) any modification occurring in the plan execution’s 
environment. The associated dataset should be analyzed or explored. The result of such data exploration might provide a positive 
(satisfactory) or negative (unsatisfactory) environment change status. Should this status be negative, this should trigger the 
Execution adjustment function. 
d-4. Execution adjustment 
DESCRIPTION: The Execution adjustment function operates on the basis of three data sources: (1) Executable Response Plan; 
(2) Plan execution feedback and status; (3) Environment’s change feedback and status. 
The Execution adjustment function should explore the correspondence between the three data sets to find alarming associations 
between the implementation of the Executable Response Plan and its effects. Should warning signs be identified, the Execution 
adjustment function should either adapt the actions’ implementation to circumstances or modify the plan. 
e. Learning and knowledge improvement 
DEFINITION: Learning and knowledge improvement is the AICA’s high-level function that allows a cyber-defense agent to 
use the agent’s experience to improve progressively its efficiency with regards to all other functions. This high-level function relies 
upon the Learning and Goals modification components of the assumed functional architecture.  
The Learning and knowledge improvement high-level function includes two functions: (1) Learning; (2) Knowledge 
improvement. 
e-1. Learning 
DESCRIPTION: The Learning function operates on the basis of two data sources: (1) Feedback data from the agent’s 
functioning; (2) Feedback data from the agent’s actions. 
The Learning function collects both data sets and analyzes the reward function of the agent (distance between goals and 
achievements) and their impact on the agent’s knowledge database. Results feed the Knowledge improvement function. 
e-2. Knowledge improvement 
DESCRIPTION: The Knowledge improvement function operates on the basis of two data sources: (1) Results (propositions) 
from the Learning function; (2) Current elements of the agent’s knowledge. 
The Knowledge improvement function merges Results (propositions) from the Learning function and the Current elements of 
the agent’s knowledge. 
V. PRELIMINARY RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND QUESTIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF LEARNING 
The environment of the agent can change rapidly, especially (but not exclusively) due to an enemy action. In addition, the 
enemy malware, its capabilities and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), evolve rapidly. Therefore, the agent must be 
capable of autonomous learning. The reasoning capabilities of the agent rely on its knowledge bases (KBs). The purpose of the 
learning function(s) of the agent is to modify the KBs of the agent in a way that enhances the success of the agent’s actions. The 
agent learns from its experiences. Therefore, the most general cycle of the learning process is the following: 
1. The agent possesses a KB. 
2. The agent uses the KB to perform actions; he also makes observation (receives percepts). These together constitute 
the agent’s experience. 
3. The agent uses this experience to learn the desirable modifications to the KB. 
4. The agent modifies the KB. 
5. Repeat.   
The agent’s experience needs a formal representation. It may look like this sequence: 
(t1, a1, e1, R1) (t2, a2, NULL, NULL) (t3, NULL, e3, R3) … (tn, an, en, Rn) 
Where t1 is the time when the agent starts to record his experience and tn is the moment “now”, an is an action, en is a percept, 
Rn is the reward of the action. 
To make the representation of knowledge more compact and useful, we could divide it into shorter chunks where each chunk 
ends with the moment when the agent is able to determine a reward. We could call such a chunk an episode. Episode Ej is a 
sequence of pairs {a1, ei}, and the resulting reward Rj:  
Ej = ({ai,, ei},Rj) 
The following is an example of such a short episode: a1 - check file system integrity; e1 - find unexpected file; a2 - delete file; 
e2 - file gone; a3 – NULL; e3 - observe Enemy C2 traffic; Reward - 0.09 
A representation of this nature could be used in a case-based reasoning, or in a deep learning approach.  
What exactly could an agent learn? One, fairly general option is that Learning Module learns the World Dynamics model which 
is a function that takes as an input a state and an action applied to that state; its output is a new state that will result from application 
of that action, or a distribution of states. World Dynamics Model is used in particular in “Action Selector and Predictor” module. In 
addition, the Learning Module can learn another function required in “Action Selector and Predictor” module, which maps the 
current world state to a set of feasible actions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Intelligent, partly autonomous agents are likely to become primary cyber fighters on the future battlefield. Our initial 
exploration identified the key functions, components and their interactions for a potential reference architecture of such an agent.  
The AICA Reference Architecture was derived from [19] for we needed a broad, cognition-based, all-encompassing agent 
structure. Future works will challenge this initial choice. 
Embedding AICA agents into highly constrained military systems is also the focus of future research and this issue was not 
addressed at this stage yet. 
And, at the present stage, the AICARA architecture is a preliminary proposal. Its feasibility as well as its power to fight 
malware autonomously and intelligently remain to be evaluated. 
With respect to further efforts, this research group plans to have a basic proof-of-concept prototype developed and tested by 
2019.The current priorities are: 
• To study use cases as a reference for the research, as this will lead to clarifying the scope, concepts, functionality and 
functions’ inputs and outputs of AICA and MAICA systems; use cases will be based on the one elaborated in the IST-
152 intermediary report [21]; 
• To refine the initially assumed architecture by drawing further lessons from the case studies; 
• To determine the set of technologies that AICAs should embark and that need to be tested during the prototyping 
phase; 
• To define the methodology of the tests. 
The sum of challenges presented by the AICA / MAICA concept appears, today, very substantial, although our initial analysis 
suggests that the required technical approaches do not seem to be entirely beyond the current state of the research. An empirical 
research program and collaboration of multiple teams should be able to produce significant results and solutions for a robust, 
effective intelligent agent. This might happen within a time span that could currently be assumed on the order of ten years. 
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